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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
PIJOJintiff and Respondent,

v.
PEGGY ALLRED, aka, PEGGY
LOVEJOY, aka, THE.LMA ALLRED,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10752

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF FOR
REHEARING AND AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

In response to the brief fi,led by Salt Lake City
together with their petition for rehearing and the brief
purported to he an amicus curiae brief, but reading with
all the earmarks of advocacy, we desire to comment
briefly on some of the cases cited in the briefs and to
cite other cases apparently ignored by those seeking a
rehearing.
American Fork v. Charliere, 43 Utah 231, 134 P.

739; Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 P. 705;

2

Annotated Cases 1912 C 189; Sfote v. Jl,hisser, 118 Utah
537, 223 P. 2d. 193, were all cited by either the appellant
or respondent in the initial briefs and have been heretofore considered by the court and add nothi11g to the present controversy.

L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 20 Sup. CL
788, 44 L Ed 693, cited by the City is a case that was
decided in 1900 on a petition by certain landowners to
hold in;y-alid an ordinance districting that city as to
limits in which prostitutes could live and operate. No person purportng to be "any public prostitute or woman
notoriously abandoned to lewdness" described in the contended ordinance was party to the suit.
1

The only fair import of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in affirming the Louisiana court
is born in the court's concluding statement at 177 U.S.
600:
"Under these circumstances we are of the opinion
that the ordinance in question is not one of which
the plaintiffs in error can complain."

Salt Lake City v. K usse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d. 671
strongly relied on by the City as indicative of the law
in Utah is a traffic case dealing with the validity of a
City ordinance prohibiting driving under the influence of
intoxicants. rrhe City in their brief neglects to point
out that the case is a rehearing of Salt Lake City v.
Kusse[e] reported at 85 P.2d 802 where the, lower court

8
was affirmed by a two-two decision with a strong dissent
by Justice Larsen, concurred in by Justice .Moffat, said
dissent being incorporated in the opinion on rehe,aring
at 93 P.2d. at page 675.
The City contends that the court's ruling applies
only to Subsections 7 and 8 of the Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-2-1, of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, Utah 1965 (See the City's brief in support of rehearing page 13). However, the entire ordinance as evidenced by its caption refers to sexual intercourse for hire
and lewd acts - and each subsection 1 through 7, with
the possible exception of subsection 4 is integrated
around "sexual intercourse for hire, lewd acts" or both.
(Subsection ± deals with "making a meretricious display") and subsection 8 specifically refers to and relates
back to Sections 1 through 7 inclusive.
It would appear that the portions of the ordinance
are not severable as all deal with the same subject matter
and a partial invalidity must necessarily invalidate the
entire ordinance. See McQuillin Municipal Corporations,
3rd Edition Vol. 6 at page 155, Section 20.64 states that
the question as to whether or not a whole ordinance is
invalidated by finding part to be invalid must be tested
hy the severability of the ordinance. Quoting at page 155:

"It is essential however that the parts upheld fonn
independently of the invalid portions, a complete
law in some reasonable aspect so that it may fairly
he concluded that the council would have enacted
it without the invalid parts." (Citing cases at

footnote 89, page 155)
The same test jndicates that a savings clause is not
controlling but is only some evidence as to the intent of
the legislature or council imssing the law or ordinance.
It seems noteworthy at this point that this court
speaking through Justice Crockett has already determined that a solicitation, proposition, or offer of sexual
intercourse, whether male to female or female to male,
does not even constitute an actionable tort in the State
o.f Utah, let alone being a crime. See Sanirns v. Eccles,
11 Utah 2d 29±, 358 P.2d 3±-t, wherein it js stated:

"The assumption is usually indulged that most
solicjtatious occur under such conditions as to
fall within the well known phrase of Chief Justice
:Magruder that 'there js no harm in asking' (:Magruder, Mental and Emotional Djsturbances jn the
Law of Torts, ±9 Harvard La\Y Revie~w 10:3:3,
1055). The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Reed
v . .Maley pertinently observed that an action will
not lie in favor of a woman against a man who
without trespass or assault makes such a request;
and the the reverse is also true; that a man would
have no right of action against a woman for such
a solicitation."
Can we find such an anomaly in the law that a
factual situation that invades neither the right of the
public or an jndividual such as to lay the basis for a
tort my be tortured into a crime by a city commission or
council when not expressly authorjzed by statutory legislation 1
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Din~cting the l'.ourt's attention to the brief herein

filed entitled "Brief of Arninrn Curiae In Support of
Hespondent's Petition for Rehearing," Black's Law Dictionary, Fomth 11~dition, at page 107:
"AlilICUS CUHIAK Lat. A friend of the court.
A by-stander (usually a counsellor) who inter]JOses and volunteers information upon some matter of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful
or mistaken, Fort ·worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Greathouse, Tex.Civ. App., .U S.vV. 2d. 418, -122; or
upon a matter of which the court may take judicial
cognizance. The Claveresk, C.C.A.N.Y. 264 F. 276,
279; In re Perry, 83 Ind. App. 456, 148 N.E. 163,
1G5. Implies friendly intervention of counsel to
remind court of legal matter which has escaped its
notice, and regarding which it appears to be in
danger of going ·wrong. Blanchard v. Boston &
~1.R., 8G N.H. 263, 167 A. 158, 160.
Also a person who has no right to appear in a
suit but is allowed to introduce argument, authority or evidence to protect his interests. Ladue v.
Goodhead, 181 Misc. 807, 44 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787."
It ·would seem that the term amicus curiae indicates
an advisor to or friend of the court, not a position of
advocacy. It will be noted that the brief, while purporting
to be that of A. M. Ferro, of the Utah Municipal League,
Eugene \V. Hansen, of the Utah State Association of
County Officials, and Ronald N. Boyce, of the Salt Lake
County Bar Legal Services, Inc., was signed by Ronald
N. BoYce, solely, who puts himself in a position of representing the Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services, Inc., an

Office of Economic Opportunity financed organization
for indigents, who are in no ·way involved in, or affected
by this litigation.
The "friend of the court" begins his discussion under
the heading, Pre-Emption in Utah Law, at page 3 of his
brief with the statement:

"It is submitted that the concept of State pre-

emption is alien to prior precedents from this
court."

apparently ignoring the quotes from Ogden City v. McLaughlin et al, 5 Utah 387, 16 P. 721 (1888) at pages 9 and
10 of appellant's original brief herein, holding in effect
that the compiled laws of Utah were controlling and
Ogden City had no power to make an ordinance making
it an offense to resort to a house of ill fame for lewdness.
Quoting from the MCJL,aughlin case, supra,
"Neither the charter of Ogden City (section 35),
giving its power to restrain and punish prostitutes, nor Compiled Laws of Utah, page 697, seetion 9, giving power to the city to suppress or
restrain bawdy and other disorderly houses, and
punish the keepers thereof, authorizes an ordinance making it an offense to resort to a house of
ill fame for lewdness.'
The court further stated:

"It is a general rule that a municipal corporation

has only surh powers as are expressly grantr.d
or essential thereto, or plainly implied therem
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(again citing Dillon ~lunicipal Cor1)oration Sec.
'
t1ons 89 and 91). And where there is a doubt
as
. to the exish'nCt> of the authority. ' such doubt
1s resolved against the eorporation (again citing
Dillon Municipal Corporation, Section 91)'' (page
722)
rn1e arnicus curiae brief goes on at pages 10 and 11

to admit that the bulk of our sexual laws come from the
territorial laws which were in effect at Statehood. California City v. Pre-emption lJy hnplicatiun, 17 Hastings
Law Journal, 603 ( 1966) is quoted by the Amicus Curiae
brief and contains an interesting and exhaustive collection of authoritit>s upon the problem and citations of judicial rulings. However, the Amicus Curiae neglected to
mention the case ·whieh is of primary importance therein.
Th<c' same being In ReCarul Lane on habea:s corpus, 22
Cal Reptr., 857, 372 P.2d. 897 (1962), wherein the Supreme Court of California on June 28, 1962, by a fivetwo decision vacated the opinion in 18 Cal. Rptr., 33, 367
P.2d. 673, and invalidated the ordinance under which
Miss Lane had been charged with "resorting to a room
for purposes of sexual intercourse," and holding at page
899:
"The Pen:al Code sections covering the criminal
aspects of sexual activity are so extensive in their
scope that they clearly show an intention by the
Legislature to adopt a general scheme for the
regulation of this subject."
The opinion then cites the various sections of the
California Penal Code referring to sexual activity m
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any aspect. It should be noted that the l~tah Cod(~ n·ferring to sexual activity is even more extensive in it;,.;
coverage than the California Code covering all aspeehi
set forth in the Lane 01Jinion and in addition thereto
making fornication a crime.
In the Lane case there are 7:2 amicm; cunae eonstituting the district attorney for eaeh district in thl·
State of California, several of the county attorney's
offices, and many of the city attorney's offices from the
principal municipalities in California. That case would
appear to be on all fours with the case upon which rehearing is being presently sought ,to wit, Salt Lake City
v. Allred, et al. The Lane case is charging the petitioner
with resorting from her living room to her bedroom for
the purpose of having sexual intercourse with a male
not her husband. Citing from page 898 of 372 P.2d.:
"(l) This is the sole question necessary for us
to determine: Has the State adopted a general
scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects
of sexual activity and determined, to the exclusion of local regulation, when sexual intercoun;P
between persons not manied to eaeh other shall
be criminal~

Yes.
(2) The Law: A local municipal ordinanel• is
invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field that is preempted by tlw
general law. (Cal.Const., art. XI ~ 11; Abbott v.
Citv of Los An (re les, 53 Cal.2d GI-I-, m~:2 3 Cal.
.
"
Rptr. 15~, ::3-4-9 P.2d m-±; Ag·m·\\· V. Cit)- of Lo~
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Angele:::;, 51 Cal. 2d. 1,5(2), 3:30 P.:2d 385; r:L'olrnan
v._ lTnderhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712(4), 249 P.2d 280;
PL poly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 3G6, 370 ( 5), 125 P. 2d
482, l-l-7 A.L.R. 515; Nat. .Milk de. Assn. v. Citv
etc. of S. :F'., 20 Cal. 2d 101, 108(1), 124 P.2d 25:)
( 3) ·whenever the Legislature has seen fit to
adopt a general scheme for the J'egulation of a
particular subjeet, the entire control over whatever phases of the subjeet are covered hy state
legislation ceases as far as local legislation is
concerned. (Pipoly v. Ben:son, supra, 20 Cal. 2d
366, 371, 125 P.2d -t82, l-:!:7 A.L.R. 515.)
( 4) In determining whether the Legislature intended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of all local regulation we may look to the
'whole purpose and scope of the legislative
scheme' and are not required to find such an
intent solely in the language used in the statute.
(Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal. 2d at p.
712(6), 2-1-9 P.2d at p. 283; Abbott v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, at pp. G82(9), 6S-t, 3 Cal. Rptr.
158.)
The Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, goes far beyond
the applicable and cornprehenseive field of regulation
of sexual activity by our State Lmv. Said ordinance
makes it unlawful for any person, male or female (not
limited to prostititutes or lewd persons): (1) to commit,
or offer to commit, or agree to commit, a lewd act.
76-39-5 through 76-39-15 (76-39-1 to 76-39-4 Repealed)
Laws of Utah 1965. An act of sexual intercourse for hire
(no legislation applicable) or an act of moral perversion
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(unintelligible, may refer to 76-53-22, Utah Uode Annotated 1943); (2) Secure or offer another for a lewd
act or act of sexual intercourse for hire, or of immoral
perversion. (May come under 76-53-10 if le-wd act::;,
sexual intercourse, for hire, or immoral pervernion can
be termed prostitution) under our court::; definition
thereof, but in any event preclude the guilt of a female
person (Mrs. Allred) by the language of that act at
lines 20-22 "with or for another male person;" ( 3) is
above and beyond and in addition to any statutory prohibition; ( 4) language relative to but not contained in
76-39-5 through 76-39-15, Laws of Utah 1965; (5) may
be contained in 76-53-8, if the acts set forth may be
interpreted as prostitution under our courts definition;
(6) same as (5) supra; ('7) comes under 76-53-10 but
cannot ref er to any person thereunder as a woman is
excluded by the language of the statute; (8) Aiders and
abetters, comes under 76-1-44, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, if the acts in (l) through (7) constitute crimes.
It is clear that the State law ha::; pre-empted the
field herein attempted to be controlled by the Salt Lake
City Commission.

In the event the Court sees fit to grant a rehearing
in the above entitled case, it is respectfully requsted that
the Court consider Points II and III of appellant's initial
brief, to-wit:
Point 11-TlH" Ordinanc<-' is :so \Tague and Aw-
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biguous as to be Unconstitutional
Point lll-rl1liat the ordinance in question attempts to rnakl~ erime;-; of acts which are not
crimes under the laws of the State of Utah
r!1 hese matters not having been dis<'ussed in the majority
opinion on the basis of rnling on pre-emption.
CONCLUSION
It is urged that the court ignore the newspaper
and television campaign regarding the above case in
considering the petition for rehearing, and if rehearing
is granted, that they consider all the points of validity
and constitutionality of the ordinance attacked.

Respectfully submitted,

HA 'J1CH & McRAE

